TO BIZERTE WITH THE II CORPS

WORLD WAR II
50th Anniversary
Commemorative Edition
TO BIZERTE
WITH THE II CORPS
23 April - 13 May 1943

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1990
Foreword to CMH Edition

To Bizerte With the II Corps (23 April–13 May 1943) is one of a series of fourteen studies of World War II operations originally published by the War Department’s Historical Division and now returned to print as part of the Army’s commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of that momentous clash of arms. These volumes, prepared by professional historians shortly after the events described, provide a concise summary of some of the major campaigns and battles fought by American soldiers. The skillful combination of combat interviews with primary sources, many of which are now lost, gives these unassuming narratives a special importance to military historians. The careful analysis of key operations provides numerous lessons for today’s military students.

I am pleased that this entire group of studies will once again be available. I urge all military students and teachers to use them to enhance our collective awareness of the skill, leadership, daring, and professionalism exhibited by our military forebears.

Washington, D.C. 15 September 1989

HAROLD W. NELSON
Colonel, FA
Chief of Military History
Foreword

In the thick of battle, the soldier is busy doing his job. He has the knowledge and confidence that his job is part of a unified plan to defeat the enemy, but he does not have time to survey a campaign from a fox hole. If he should be wounded and removed behind the lines, he may have even less opportunity to learn what place he and his unit had in the larger fight.

American Forces in Action is a series prepared by the War Department especially for the information of wounded men. It will show these soldiers, who have served their country so well, the part they and their comrades played in achievements which do honor to the record of the United States Army.

G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.
To Bizerte With The II Corps is the first of a series called AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION. The series is designed exclusively for military personnel and primarily for wounded in hospitals. It aims to tell them the military story of the campaigns and battles in which they served. No part of this pamphlet may be republished without the consent of the A. C. of S., G–2, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

This pamphlet is based on the best military records now available. Maps were prepared by the Historical Section, Army War College. All photographs, except of terrain models, are by the U. S. Army Signal Corps. Terrain models were made by the Camouflage Branch, Engineer Board, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Readers are urged to send comments, criticisms, and additional information directly to the Historical Branch, G–2, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.
## Table of Contents

### Introduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE FINAL CAMPAIGN FOR NORTH AFRICA</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREPARATIONS FOR THE LAST BATTLE</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans of the Eighteenth Army Group</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Allies Control the Air</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The II Corps Moves to the North</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY OF II CORPS ACTION</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The First Phase

*The II Corps Drives to Mateur*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A TERRAIN OF HILL FORTRESSES</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAN OF ATTACK IN THE SOUTHERN ZONE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE 1ST DIVISION PUSH TO DJEBEL SIDI MEFTAH (23-27 APRIL)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 26th Regimental Combat Team</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 16th Regimental Combat Team</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 18th Regimental Combat Team</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE ATTACK IS WIDENED</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance to Hill 609</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 34th Division Captures Hill 609</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1St Division Reaches the Edge of the Hills</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION SOUTH OF THE TINE (23 APRIL-2 MAY)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE 9TH DIVISION IN THE NORTHERN ZONE</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Plan of Attack</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefna Is Outflanked</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action North of the Sedjenane (24-27 April)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE GERMAN RETREAT AND THE CAPTURE OF MATEUR</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE SECOND PHASE
.Axis Resistance Is Broken

PLANS FOR THE WIND UP OF THE CAMPAIGN ........................................... 37
General Situation on 2 May ................................................................. 37
Plans of the Eighteenth Army Group ....................................................... 37
Plans of the II Corps ........................................................................ 38
THROUGH TO CHOUIGUI ........................................................................ 38
Holding Attack of the 1st Division .......................................................... 39
The 34th Division Captures Eddehila and Chouigui .................................. 39
NORTH OF THE LAKES TO BIZERTE ...................................................... 40
BREAKTHROUGH BY THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION .............................. 44
Djebel Achkel ....................................................................................... 44
The Drive Through Ferryville to the East ................................................. 46
The Drive to Portville ............................................................................ 48
THE AXIS SURRENDERS ........................................................................ 49

CONCLUSION

TAKING COUNT ....................................................................................... 51
THE WORLD ACKNOWLEDGES THE VICTORY .................................... 52

* * *

ANNEX NO. 1: UNITS TAKING PART IN THE BIZERTE CAMPAIGN ........ 54
ANNEX NO. 2: DECORATIONS ................................................................. 57
Maps

No.
1  18th Army Group, Plan of Operations in Northern Tunisia
   Inside back cover
2  Operations of the First Phase, 23 April–3 May 1943   Faces Page 9
3  The Southern Area, First Phase   Inside back cover
4  1st Division Drive to Djebel Sidi Meftah, 23–27 April 1943
   Inside back cover
5  Hill 609—Djebel el Anz Area, 27 April–2 May 1943
   Inside back cover
6  The 1st Armored Division in the Tine Valley, 23 April–1 May 1943   Inside back cover
7  9th Division Attack on the Ainchouna-Jefna Positions, 23 April–1 May 1943
   Inside back cover
8  Northern Area, 60th CT and Corp Franc, 23 April–2 May 1943
   Inside back cover
9  Operations of the Second Phase, 4–9 May 1943   Faces Page 37
10 The Southern Area, Second Phase   Inside back cover
11 The Northern Area, Second Phase   Inside back cover
12 Summary of II Corps Operations in Northern Tunisia, 23 April–9 May 1943
   Inside back cover

Sketches

1  Djebel Cheniti Area, 4–8 May 1943   Page 42
2  Mateur–Ferryville Area, 6–7 May 1943   45
Photographs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Gen. O. N. Bradley</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Terry Allen</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. M. S. Eddy</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. C. W. Ryder</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. E. N. Harmon</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Melah Valley from the Southwest</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djebel Sidi Meftah Area from the Southwest</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill Positions in the Line of the Advance to Hill 609 from the West</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill 609 (Djebel Tahent) from the Southwest</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives of the 9th Division from the West</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain of the Attack on the Ainchouna–Jefna Positions from the West</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Line in the Sedjenane Zone</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Infantry on the Road to Mateur</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Battalion Approaching Bizerte</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bizerte</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Terrain Studies</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The Final Campaign for North Africa

A DELEGATION OF GERMAN OFFICERS arrived at American Headquarters south of Ferryville at 0926 on the morning of 9 May 1943. Their mission was to surrender the remnants of a once proud unit of the Wehrmacht, the formidable Fifth Panzer Army. On the same morning, two German staff officers reported at the Command Post of the 1st Armored Division southeast of Bizerte to request an armistice. Three days later, General Jürgen von Arnim was captured at Ste. Marie du Zit. Marshal Giovanni Messe, commanding the Italian First Army, surrendered unconditionally to the British Eighth Army on 13 May. The long battle for North Africa was ended.

These events were the culmination of grand strategy but were made possible only by the heroic struggle of Allied soldiers across the coastal areas of North Africa, through deserts, mountains, and swamps. Troops of the II Corps, U. S. A., who had entered the fight for Africa with the invasion on 8 November 1942, played a prominent role in the decisive final battle which opened on 23 April.

The stage had been set for that battle by a campaign, lasting for months, in which German and Italian troops were finally penned into the northeastern part of Tunisia. Starting 23 October from El Alamein, General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighth Army had pushed the Afrika Korps 1,500 miles along the desert coast of North Africa and into the Mareth Line in southern Tunisia. Within 2 weeks of the November landings in Northwest Africa, British and American forces under General Dwight D. Eisenhower were driving from Algeria into western Tunisia in an effort to seize the great ports of Tunis and Bizerte. German reinforcements, rushed into Africa in the nick of time, stopped the advance just short of the
Tunis plain. With operations now made difficult by the rainy winter season, the Allied Army fought bitter engagements in the mountains from Sedjenane Station to Medjez el Bab. To the south, American units in hard fighting stopped savage German drives through Kasserine Pass toward the Allied base at Tebessa and kept pressure on the long Axis communications between Field Marshal Rommel and Tunis.

In late March, Rommel's forces were driven from the Mareth Line toward the north. Protecting his line of retreat, the enemy fought a stubborn delaying action against the Americans and the British in the El Guettar-Gafsa area. By 22 April the equivalent of 5 Italian and 9 German divisions were at bay for what they planned to be a protracted defense of Tunis and Bizerte. But the Axis was not allowed a breathing space to strengthen its defenses. The Allied forces, united under General Sir Harold R. Alexander as the Eighteenth Army Group, were already preparing the blow that was to destroy the enemy forces in a battle lasting 21 days.

**Preparations for the Last Battle**

**PLANS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ARMY GROUP**

*Map No. 1, inside back cover*

General Alexander's Eighteenth Army Group included the British-French First Army under Lt. Gen. Sir Kenneth A. N. Anderson, the British Eighth Army under General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, and the United States II Corps commanded by Maj. Gen. (now Lt. Gen.) Omar N. Bradley. For administrative purposes, the II Corps was under the First Army. Supporting the First Army and II Corps were the 242d Group (RAF), the XII Air Support Command, and the Tactical Bomber Force. Thus for the final drive to capture Tunisia, General Alexander had more than 20 divisions, in 3 main groups, on a front of about 140 miles.

General Montgomery's Eighth Army held the Allied right flank in the mountainous Enfidaville sector. Its role was to maintain pressure on the enemy in this area and to advance against his route of escape into the Cap Bon Peninsula. The main Allied attack was to be delivered in the center of the front by the forces of the British-
French First Army; seven infantry divisions (three French) and nearly three armored divisions. In this area lay the two principal natural corridors into the Tunis plain: the valleys of the Medjerda and the Miliane. While the French XIX Corps, in the Miliane valley, drove northeast, the main effort was to be along the Medjez el Bab-Tunis axis, in an area where armored units could best maneuver. The United States II Corps, with the Corps Franc d'Afrique, was to operate on the left flank of the British attack, with the high ground southeast of Matour and the heights between Jefna and Garaet Achkel as principal objectives. This attack would endanger the flank and rear of enemy forces facing the British drive.

In its simplest outline, the Allied plan was for a powerful thrust in the center heavily supported by armor, with secondary attacks on the flanks to hold the enemy down and prevent him from concentrating to meet the main effort.

**The Allies Control the Air**

For the months preceding the battle the heavy bombers of the Strategic Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle, had been carrying out raids against Axis shipping, supply lines, and air bases in Tunisia and in Europe, with significant results for the battle for North Africa. As the Tunisian campaign developed, the attacks were directed at the transportation facilities and ports of Sicily and southern Italy, especially Naples, Messina, and Palermo. Meanwhile medium bombers and fighters were striking at enemy surface and aerial shipping in the Sicilian Strait. Allied air attacks and the activities of the British Navy were making precarious any long-term existence of the Axis forces in Tunisia.

The Tactical Air Force, commanded by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, was prepared to collaborate with the field armies in bombing and strafing rear installations, roads, and convoys. In one sense the final phase of the Tunisian campaign began not on 23 April but on the nights of 18 and 19 April, when the Allies employed 90 night bombers against German airdromes and destroyed 129 Axis planes, including 72 out of 100 enemy transports. On 22 April the Tactical Air Force destroyed 20 ME-323 6-engine transports carrying the equivalent of a regiment into Tunisia.

By the opening of the battle on 23 April, the Allied Air Force
had won the mastery of the air from the Luftwaffe. One major result, it is believed, was the enemy's inability to secure knowledge of the surprise move of the II Corps from southern to northern Tunisia until after it was completed. During the first 2 days of action, the Tactical Air Force made 1,500 sorties, but from 25 April to 5 May weather conditions grounded most of the planes. Air power was to play an important role again on 6 and 7 May, when the Allied Air Force blasted the enemy in the Medjerda Valley and contributed powerfully to the decisive breakthrough by the First Army.

THE II CORPS MOVES TO THE NORTH

When General Anderson, commanding the First Army, issued his operational orders for the final phase of the Tunisian campaign, the II Corps was completing an action in southern Tunisia. In order to reach assigned positions for the attack on 23 April, the II Corps had to move more than 100,000 men, plus equipment of all types, an average distance of 150 miles over difficult country and across the communication lines of the First Army. In addition, supplies for the coming operation had to be assembled from bases and ports many miles to the west. The accomplishment of this move was one of the outstanding achievements of transport and supply in the North African campaign. The 9th Division reached the northern area and began relieving British units on 12 April. The 1st Division arrived in its zone on 16 April. Forward units of the 1st Armored Division came into the Beja sector on 22 April, followed by the 34th Division on the following day.
LT. GEN. O. N. BRADLEY
Commanding General, II Corps
United States Army
MAJ. GEN. TERRY ALLEN
Commanding General, 1st Division
United States Army

MAJ. GEN. C. W. RYDER
Commanding General, 34th Division
United States Army

MAJ. GEN. M. S. EDDY
Commanding General, 9th Division
United States Army

MAJ. GEN. E. N. HARMON
Commanding General, 1st Armored Division
United States Army
Organization of the United States II Corps (23 April-9 May 1943)
(See Annex No. 1, page 54, for Troop List)
Summary of II Corps Action

The operation of the II Corps, U. S. A., lasted 17 days and involved advances of 25 to 50 miles by four divisions. As ordered by General Alexander, our main effort was made on the right flank. Three divisions began the attack on a 13-mile front where advance by the II Corps would best support the big British thrust in the Medjerda Valley. On the northern part of our front, one division and the Corps Franc d’Afrique struck at enemy defenses west of Mateur.

The easiest way to follow the II Corps battle is to see it in terms of the two main phases in which the action developed in point of time. In the first phase, 23 April to 3 May, the II Corps stormed or outflanked all the major German hill fortresses, and forced an enemy retreat to a line east of Mateur and the Tine Valley on the last hills protecting the roads to Bizerte and Tunis. In the second phase, 4 to 9 May, the II Corps struck the new enemy line in key areas, broke through to capture Bizerte and Chouigui, and forced the surrender of all Axis troops left in its zone.

The II Corps was not fighting isolated battles; its action was always geared to a coordinated Allied operation. Although the larger story cannot be told here, the battle of Tunisia was won by the Eighteenth Army Group. The II Corps played its part, and played it well, in a great Allied victory.
The Story of the First Phase (23 April - 3 May)

In the southern part of the II Corps zone, the opening drives were made into the high ground bordering the Oued Tine Valley. By 26 April the 1st Division had gained 5 hard miles north of the valley, wresting the hills from German hands in bloody fighting marked by successful night attacks and effective use of artillery. The 34th Division and the 1st now teamed up for a further advance. Swinging into action west of Sidi Nsir, the 34th climaxed its drive by taking Hill 609, while the 1st pushed eastward another 5 miles. Meanwhile, the 6th Armored Infantry made steady progress along the edge of the range south of the Oued Tine. By 1 May, these coordinated efforts had taken all the key hill fortresses in the southern zone, and the Tine Valley was opened for an armored blow.

The 9th Division had been equally successful to the north. Its combat teams fought through the hills north of Jefna to outflank that strong position. By 1 May, the spearheads of the 9th were in sight of the plain near Garaet Achkel, and the Germans were pulling out of Jefna.

Forced in two areas to the edge of the hill belt protecting Mateur, the Germans risked disaster and knew it. With the 1st Armored Division on their heels, they withdrew beyond Mateur and into the hills just west of Chouigui. In 10 days, the II Corps had driven the enemy back 15 to 18 miles and unhinged his whole northern flank. Mateur was our main prize in this first phase of the battle. With that key center of communications in our possession, the stage was set for the final phase of the battle for northern Tunisia.

The detailed account which follows will be clearer by occasional reference to this map and to six additional maps (Nos. 3-8) which will be found inside the back cover of this book.
THE FIRST PHASE

The II Corps Drives to Mateur

A Terrain of Hill Fortresses

(Map No. 2, facing page 9)

THE II CORPS, holding a front of about 40 miles from Cap Serrat to the Medjerda Valley, was to attack highly organized enemy positions in terrain as difficult as can be found in the whole battle area. A belt of rugged hill country, 15 to 20 miles in depth, lay between the American lines and Mateur, a center of enemy communications and key to the Bizerte area. The map suggests a main ridge pattern running from southwest to northeast—roughly, the direction planned for the II Corps attack. In detail, however, the hills and ridges form a jumbled maze, providing no broad corridors for an advance. The high ground averages 500 to 1,000 feet above the narrow valleys.

In the bare country south of the Sidi Nsir-Mateur road, where trees and brush are scarce, the rocky slopes steepen at times into cliffs. The valleys offered little or no cover, and, as one officer remarked, "The enemy on his hill positions was constantly looking right down your throat." In the sector north of Sidi Nsir to the coast, the problem of cover ran to the opposite extreme. Here, in equally rugged country, the valleys and lower slopes are covered with dense scrub. Movement of any sort was difficult; paths for guns or supplies had to be hacked out by hand.

Four small rivers flow through the hills toward Mateur and Garaet (Lake) Achkel, but none of these streams opens up an easy route for an attack to follow. The Sedjenane, Melah, and Djoumine wind in deep and narrow valleys dominated by steep hills. The most southern of the four, the Oued (River) Tine, has a valley sometimes 2 or 3 miles wide, but still too narrow for easy passage.
if the adjacent heights are held by the enemy. Only two hard-surfaced roads cross the hills to Mateur: the highway from Sedjenane, following the Melah Valley, and the Beja road in the Djoumine Valley. These roads were of more importance to the II Corps operations as lines of rear supply than as routes of access to Mateur. For the rest, mere trails and paths connect the scattered Arab villages and farms.

The rugged country facing the II Corps had two disadvantages for our men. It was naturally suited to defensive fighting, and was very familiar to the enemy. Skilled in all the arts of defensive warfare, the Germans had organized strong positions during the months they had held the area. The narrow valleys, followed by streams and roads, were blocked in depth by minefields. Machine-gun and mortar posts on the hills, and artillery directed from excellent observation posts, controlled the natural corridors of approach.

Advance through country of this sort had to be made the hard way. The valleys had to be cleared of mines and the enemy driven from the high ground, but the fight for the high ground was no simple matter of taking a few key heights. Although a hill like 609\(^1\) dominated the country for miles around, it was flanked on all sides by smaller but still difficult hills which must be taken in order to approach the main enemy position. Again and again the attack encountered a group of mutually supporting positions, and an advance of a mile or two might demand the capture of half a dozen hills on a narrow front. The II Corps was in for hill-to-hill fighting, with each main hill a fortress.

**Plan of Attack in the Southern Zone**

*(Map No. 3, inside back cover)*

In the southern part of the II Corps zone, the 1st Division (Maj. Gen. Terry Allen), the 34th Division (Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder), and the 1st Armored Division (Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon) were to make the main attack on a front of 13 miles. Through the area facing the American troops ran two chief routes to Mateur: the Djoumine Valley, followed by a highway and railroad, and the

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\(^1\) Hill numbers designate height in meters above sea level; 609 meters = 1998 feet.
Oued Tine Valley. The narrow Djoumine Valley was completely controlled by steep hill positions. The broader Oued Tine Valley seemed to offer the one main corridor to the northeast for an armored striking force. General Bradley realized, however, that such an attack might run into a natural “mousetrap.” The valley, heavily mined, was flanked by ridges and hills on both sides and narrowed as it ran east. The advance of armored units depended on control of the hills.

The opening attack was, therefore, made into the hills which dominate the upper Tine Valley. The 1st Division, organized in three regimental combat teams, was to clear the hills north of the Oued Tine; the 6th Armored Infantry of the 1st Armored Division was to attack the hills on the southern rim of the valley. The flank north of the Beja-Mateur road was to be covered by a combat team of the 34th Division, which was just coming into that zone. The rest of the 34th Division and units of the 1st Armored were in support.

The 1st Division Push to Djebel Sidi Meftah (23–27 April)

The 1st Division jumped off on a 6-mile front, extending from the hills just south of Sidi Nsir to the Tine Valley. The direction of the attack led into a belt of hills 7 miles deep from Kef el Goraa (Hill 575) to the eastern end of Djebel (Hill) Sidi Meftah (Map No. 4, inside back cover). Three strongpoints turned out to be the keys of German defense, and the story of the first days centers on the fighting for Hills 575, 400, and 407. These heights fell in the zones of attack of the 26th, 16th, and 18th Regimental Combat Teams.

The 26th Regimental Combat Team

The enemy facing the 26th Regimental Combat Team was advantageously established, especially on Kef el Goraa (Hill 575). The approaches to his strongpoints, through smooth and round-topped hills, offered little concealment except for occasional patches of short wheat. The enemy positions were strongly prepared and well camouflaged. Rocky hide-outs offered excellent protection against the air bursts of our artillery. During the attack on Hill
Djebel Sidi Meftah Area from the Southwest

Photographed from terrain model prepared by Camouflage Branch, Engineer Board, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
575, the infantry and detachments of the 1st Engineers cleared 1,800 mines from the area, particularly from the wheatfields.

The attack of the 26th Infantry jumped off before dawn on 23 April behind a concentration by the 33d Field Artillery Battalion and part of the Corps Artillery. The 1st Battalion captured Hill 565 at 0355 against light opposition. When the advance continued across the valley, heavy enemy fire caused many casualties, and the attack stalled 300 yards short of the main objective. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, in support of the 1st, had moved up to Hill 565, and its forward elements reached a point 1,000 yards south of 575 in a flanking movement. Enemy troops on the forward slopes of the hill forced them back with heavy fire. Having failed to capture their objective, the two battalions withdrew to Hill 565.

On 24 April, our artillery intermittently shelled enemy positions on Hill 575. The 3d Battalion of the 26th, having been relieved on the left by units of the 34th Division, moved up to support a renewed attack planned for 25 April. By this time the 16th Infantry had outflanked Hill 575 by capturing three important hills to the southeast. According to a prisoner-of-war report, the enemy had pulled out of Hill 575 at 0200, the hour when our attack jumped off, leaving only a rear guard. The 2d Battalion occupied the hill at 0350, and a few hours later the 1st Battalion had possession of Hill 533 to the north. The 3d Battalion advanced northeast of 575 and continued along the ridge toward Djebel Tauta (Hill 444), which was occupied in the afternoon. As the 1st Division pushed forward, the 2d Battalion of the 168th Infantry (34th Division) moved southeast from Hill 344 and took over Hills 533 and 575.

**The 16th Regimental Combat Team**

Early on 23 April, while the 26th Combat Team was making its initial attack on 575, the 16th Infantry advanced into the hills to the southeast and by the end of the morning had taken Hills 415 and 374. The enemy fought stubbornly, subjecting our troops to mortar and artillery fire from the slopes of Hill 407. Hill 400 saw the hardest fighting and changed hands three times before it was finally taken, shortly before noon. On the next day, with Hill 400 in its possession, the 16th Infantry was able to capture three more heights: Hills 491 and 469, to the north, and 394, midway between 400 and
During the night of 24-25 April, the Germans withdrew on the whole division front. The 16th Combat Team had played an important part in forcing this retirement. In the follow-up of the enemy movement, the 16th occupied Hill 342 as division reserve.

**The 18th Regimental Combat Team**

To clean out enemy positions on the division's right the 2d Battalion of the 18th Regimental Combat Team, with the 1st battalion, 13th Armored Infantry attached, advanced on 23 April against Hill 350 on the west side of the main Tine Valley. The early stages of the attack were successful, but counterattacks by elements of the 10th Panzer Division from Hill 407 pushed the 2d Battalion off the high ground by 0730. To protect the flank toward 407, the 2d Battalion moved with tank support through minefields around the north side of Hill 350 to attack Hill 306. After 5 hours of stiff fighting, marked by numerous counterattacks, the 18th Combat Team had captured both Hill 350 and Hill 306. In spite of heavy casualties, particularly in E Company, it went on to strike at 407, a mile to the northwest.

The main attack on 407 jumped off early the next morning, 24 April, against initial stubborn resistance and heavy fire of all weapons. Nevertheless, the hill fortress was in our hands by 0400. There was much evidence that its power to resist had been weakened by poundings from our artillery, and especially by a heavy concentration laid down for an hour before the attack.

Threatened with the loss of all commanding ground in this area, the enemy continued to keep Hill 407 under heavy fire and counterattacked Hill 306 about 0900. Despite success at Hill 306, there were signs that the enemy was preparing to pull out to the east, and by the morning of 25 April a German withdrawal was under way. The 18th Combat Team was thus enabled to move several miles forward; and by 1400 on the 25th, leading elements reached the western end of the long Djebel Sidi Meftah ridge (point 347), occupying Hill 340 on the way. Part of the heights at the entrance to the main Tine Valley had been conquered.
The Attack is Widened

(Map No. 5, inside back cover)

By 26 April the 1st Division had attained its initial objectives and controlled all the high ground south of a line from Hill 575 to Hill 347 (Djebel Sidi Meftah). However, the division now had a long flank on the left, exposed to enemy counterattack from strong positions on high ground. Corps Headquarters saw that any further progress eastward would increase the danger to this flank.

The next moves, therefore, were coordinated blows by the 34th and 1st Divisions. The 34th was to attack into the hills east and west of Sidi Nsir, with Hill 609 (Djebel Tahent) as a key objective. Supported on its flank by this attack, the 1st Division was to carry on its offensive eastward and complete the opening of the Tine Valley.

The ground facing the 34th Division was as hard to fight through as the area just won by the 1st Division. The German right flank was anchored on Djebel el Hara, west of Sidi Nsir and dominating the highway and railroad from Beja to Mateur. To the east, the enemy held Hills 435, 490, and 609. From these heights, as a result of the retirement forced by the 1st Division, the enemy line now ran slightly south of east to the eastern end of Djebel Sidi Meftah.

The Advance to Hill 609

The attack on the 34th Division was aimed at one of the strongest defensive areas in the German line. The enemy had held this ground for months and had used this time to organize a whole series of positions protecting the valley to Mateur and the road from Sidi Nsir to the Tine Valley. Outstanding in height, Hill 609 was the key fortress in this area, and its approaches were defended by supporting positions on hills almost as difficult.

Two of the more important outlying defenses of Hill 609 were the ridge of Djebel el Hara and Hill 375. The key features of the ridges were two high points (407 and 473). Across a wadi to the northeast, Hill 375 was a supporting position. Our capture of these strongly fortified hills would compel the Germans to fall back east of Sidi Nsir.

The enemy held on through 3 days of artillery fire and infantry attacks. On 25 April, the 175th Field Artillery Battalion and several
Hill Positions in the Line of the Advance to Hill 609 from the West
Photographed from terrain model prepared by Camouflage Branch, Engineer Board, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
battalions of Corps Artillery laid down a heavy fire on Djebel el Hara. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 168th Regimental Combat Team then began their assault, but enemy machine-gun and mortar fire halted the advance after slight progress. On 25–26 April, the artillery fired numerous concentrations on Hills 407 and 473 to soften enemy positions. On 27 April, after renewed heavy shelling by the artillery, the infantry again attacked. The 2d Battalion moved up from the southeast and obtained a foothold on the southern slopes of Djebel el Hara. On the next day, while the 2d Battalion mopped up Hills 473 and 407, the 1st Battalion went on to capture Hill 375.

While this success was being achieved on the left, the 135th Regimental Combat Team was finding harder going toward Hill 609. Its first effort was directed at Hill 490, which protected the approach to 609. In the opinion of the men who finally captured it, Hill 490 was "tough." When the attack jumped off at 0430 on 27 April, the 3d Battalion had to cross a stream bed to get to the 600-foot hill, and the enemy, firmly entrenched, was ready for the doughboys. Nearing the base of the hill, the 3d Battalion was under fire from machine guns, mortars, and artillery. At 1600, after hours of hard fighting, the 3d had troops on 490, but they were forced to withdraw. In a night attack, K Company gained an advantage which was decisive, and by morning of 28 April the hill was occupied. Enemy artillery started shelling with air bursts, causing heavy casualties. In the afternoon the Germans made four counterattacks, two of them rather weak, which were subdued by rifle fire, and two desperate attempts which were only repulsed by artillery. Hill 490 was ours.

THE 34TH DIVISION CAPTURES HILL 609

Hill 609 was now accessible but promised no easy conquest. With wall-like cliffs at several points, this flat-topped fortress dominated the open country on all sides. Plans for the capture of 609 included the taking of two supporting strongpoints, Hill 461 by the 2d Battalion of the 135th, and Hill 531 by the 1st Battalion. From these hills, the 1st and 2d Battalions were to attack 609 from the southeast and northwest, respectively, while the 3d Battalion made a feint at the southwestern end and carried out a holding action. The 2d Battalion of the 168th was to operate against the enemy to the north of Hill 609.
American artillery fire, strong and incessant, had pounded away all day on 28 April. The valley resounded with the rumble of shells and the splitting of rock. At 0500 on the 29th the attack began. The 3d Battalion of the 135th moved across the valley from Hill 490 to take a position at the base of Hill 609 near its southwest approach. Owing to enemy resistance at 531 and 461, the 1st and 2d Battalions were unable to move as planned against Hill 609. The holding action of the 3d Battalion then became, in fact, an unsupported frontal attack on a formidable hill fortress.

During the morning the battalion had worked its way to three rocky knolls at the base. There they met a shower of mortar shells, and intermittent artillery fire, which chipped off great chunks of rock but caused few casualties. The battalion withdrew a short distance and reorganized. By 1100 one unit reached the Arab village under the cliffs on the south side of the hill. Again the enemy machine-gun and mortar fire was heavy. In bitter, tricky fighting, our troops snaked their way in and out among the rocks. By dusk the 3d Battalion had made a half-mile advance up the southern slopes.

The attack was renewed at about 0500 the next morning. The 3d Battalion of the 135th Infantry and the 1st Battalion of the 133d Infantry, led by Company I (medium tanks) of the 1st Armored Regiment, advanced rapidly under a heavy fire which knocked out two tanks. Tanks and infantry moved with excellent coordination and cooperation; one report states that the infantry "grabbed and held onto the tails of their tanks." The 2d Battalion of the 168th moved at the same time to attack the northern nose of 609. There they were later joined by the 1st Battalion of the 133d. After cleaning out the foothills and machine-gun nests beyond them, our infantry gained the northern slopes and by nightfall controlled most of the summit. Some units then gave assistance to the 1st Battalion, fighting on 531. The 3d Platoon of the tank company, which had undergone heavy antitank fire, returned under cover of the 2d Platoon to the assembly area behind 490. Enemy artillery fire kept up during the day and during the afternoon was very intense.

But the battle for 609 was not over. On the night of 30 April the 2d Battalion of the 168th Infantry took over from the 135th Infantry. Still holding positions on the northeastern slopes, the enemy counterattacked at dawn, supported by machine-gun and
heavy mortar fire. The attacking force was spotted early, and a platoon of Company F shifted its position, let the Germans get within 200 yards, and by devastating surprise fire repulsed the effort. This was one of the outstanding actions which established our hold on 609. Following their counterattack, the Germans withdrew but continued to dive-bomb the hill and place artillery fire on it during the day. Tersely summarizing these operations, General Bradley wrote: "A strong enemy attack was repulsed. Fighting all day was intense and bloody. The enemy was engaged with bayonet and grenade, and there were many cases of outstanding bravery."

The great effort made by the enemy to hold and then to recapture Hill 609 is evidence of its importance in the battle for this whole hill area. The success here of the 34th Division went far to safeguard and assist the advance which the 1st Division was making in the hills farther to the east.

**The 1st Division Reaches the Edge of the Hills**

The 1st Division, with the 34th Division swinging into action on its left flank, had resumed its attack to the northeast. Progress in this direction would outflank Hill 609 and would still further clear the way for advance down the Tine Valley. Djebel el Anz and Djebel Badjar were the immediate objectives of this drive; beyond them, the Germans would have little commanding ground for continued defense of the approaches to Mateur and the Chouigui hills.

On the 1st Division's left and under fire from the enemy on Hill 609, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 16th Infantry advanced on Hill 531. This position, supporting Hill 609 and about a half mile south, was partially occupied on 28 April, but the enemy still held the reverse slopes. On the next day the enemy counterattacked against Hill 531, but I Company held the position.

Another strategic position was Hill 523, lying east of Hill 609. The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, attacked this strongpoint on 29 April with artillery support, but made little headway. On 30 April the 1st Battalion joined in the attack, and the hill fell to a bayonet charge before 0300. The attack carried on northeast about a half mile to take Hill 545. The enemy counterattacked furiously and recovered both positions, which were vital to his defense of Hill 609.

While the enemy counterattack was in progress, Company H of
the 1st Armored Regiment was moving up from its bivouac near Beja to support the 16th Infantry. The enemy had succeeded in recovering both Hill 545 and Hill 523 before the tanks arrived. When the tank platoons of Company H moved into the valley before 523, our infantry was pinned down by enemy machine-gun and rifle fire. The 1st Platoon took up a defiladed position behind a steep cliff in the middle of the area while the 2d Platoon attempted to move down the valley. Enemy 47-mm guns knocked out three tanks, including that of the company commander. The rest of the 2d Platoon then joined the 1st Platoon in its defiladed position, and the tanks, once more moving down the valley, destroyed two 47-mm guns and a machine-gun nest. The difficult terrain, however, prevented the tanks from advancing to their objective, and the infantry was still pinned down by rifle fire.

The fall of 609 made Hill 523 of no further importance to the enemy. The reconnaissance section of a tank destroyer battalion, attached to the 34th Division, established an observation post on 523 prior to daylight on 1 May. On the next morning our troops moved in, skirting the minefield left by the Germans at the base of the hill.

On the center of the 1st Division front, the 26th Regimental Combat Team struck toward Djebel el Anz. The enemy began a withdrawal from points east of Djebel Touta late in the afternoon on 27 April. The 26th Combat Team followed the withdrawal, and its patrols reached Djebel el Anz, north of a track to Tebourba. On the next day, 28 April, a stiff contest developed for possession of Djebel el Anz and its surrounding heights. The 26th Infantry held part of the key hill before 0700 and during the afternoon was compelled to fight off 2 counterattacks in which the enemy took heavy losses, especially from our devastating artillery fire. The 7th Company of the German 755th Regiment lost all but 30 or 40 of its men, according to a prisoner-of-war report. As night fell, the enemy was very active on Hill 286 northeast of Djebel el Anz. While our troops consolidated their positions during the next day, the enemy regrouped his forces for counterattack. Five times on 30 April the Germans tried to recapture Djebel el Anz, but every attempt was repulsed.

On the long ridge bordering the Tine Valley, the 18th Regimental Combat Team encountered relatively less opposition and made the
farthest advance to the east. On the morning of 28 April, the 18th Infantry occupied Djebel Sidi Meftah without opposition as far as point 281 and then felt out enemy positions on the north and south sides of Djebel Badjar. An enemy counterattack, which developed between Djebel el Anz and Djebel Badjar shortly before noon, was broken up by concentrated artillery fire. Advance elements of the 18th Infantry reached point 216, on the eastern end of Djebel Sidi Meftah, in the face of artillery fire from the east. For the next 3 days the front was relatively quiet, and the enemy maintained his positions on and around Djebel Badjar. But on 2 May heavy motor traffic indicated that the Germans were withdrawing to the north and east. The fall of Djebel el Anz and the enemy’s failure to recapture it made his position on Djebel Badjar untenable.

From 23 April to 1 May the 1st Division accomplished a 10-mile advance which gained for it the full control of the hills north of the Tine Valley. On the other side of the “Mousetrap” units of the 1st Armored Division were matching this progress.

The 1st Armored Division South of the Tine (23 April–2 May)

At the start of the II Corps action, most of the 1st Armored Division was held in corps reserve. Before armor could play its full part, the Tine Valley must be opened up. The 1st Armored made its contribution to this effort by use of the 6th Armored Infantry (Map No. 6, inside back cover). Attached to the 1st Division, which was attacking the hills on the north side of the valley, the 6th Armored Infantry had a parallel assignment on the southern edge. Here again the enemy had to be driven out of hills from which his artillery fire could control movement along the valley. These hills were on the western flank of a long irregular belt of rugged ground dominated by Djebel el Ang (Hill 668) and separating the zones of the II Corps and the First Army. Action by the 6th Armored Infantry had to be coordinated with the British fight for Heidous and for control of the eastern side.
of this belt. In effect, the 6th Armored Infantry was securing both the right flank of the main effort of the II Corps and the left flank of a difficult and important operation by the British.

When the battle began, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 6th Armored Infantry were occupying positions on a line southwest from Djebel Bech Chekaoui. On 23 April the 3d Battalion was to attack eastward at 0330 against Hill 526; then proceed a mile northeast to attack Hills 420 and 481, and Hill 485 a half mile to the south. (This drive was described in a field order as being a "right hook" delivered generally along the division's right boundary.) The 1st Battalion was to drive north from Djebel Bech Chekaoui and seize Hills 493 and 395. As the 3d Battalion progressed in its attack, the 1st was to swing east in support. Assault guns and mortars were to support the 3d Battalion, with the 68th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support.

The attack by the 3d Battalion jumped off as scheduled on 23 April after a 20-minute concentration by the 68th Field Artillery Battalion. Hill 526 was taken without opposition. Company G then started toward Hill 485 but was driven back by mortar fire from the west edge of Hill 420. While Company H organized Hill 526, Company I assembled in a wadi behind the hill and at 0845 began a drive around the west side of Hill 347 to attack Hill 420. By afternoon advanced elements were on the end of the ridge but could not consolidate their position. Although Hill 485 was occupied by 1800, a night attack failed to clean up Hill 420, and the enemy held on to 420 and 481 through the next day.

The 1st Battalion, after occupying 493 and 395, had turned northeast and found the enemy strongly established on Hill 388. Company B gained a part of the crest in a night attack but was dislodged early on 24 April by a strong German counterattack. The 1st Battalion prepared a new effort. Our artillery dropped a very effective 15-minute concentration of high explosive on Hill 388 in the afternoon, and by 2300 Company C captured the position. Company B moved up to aid in holding against possible counterattacks.

Patrols sent out on 25 April reported no enemy for 1,000 yards around Hill 388, and prisoners stated that the Germans were withdrawing to positions 5 miles to the east. Again the prisoners testified to the accuracy of our artillery, which had prevented food and
ammunition from being brought up. Other factors were instrumental in causing the withdrawal. While the 6th Armored was penetrating the hills bordering the Tine, the British on the right flank were making headway and had seized Heidous. The Germans now gave up a whole series of strongly organized positions north of Djebel el Ang, and fell back to a second line of defense in the hills on the edge of the Tine Valley east of the Bed Farm.

At 2200, on 26 April, the 1st Armored Division took over the Tine Valley zone. The main effort on 27 April was to be made east of the Tine by Combat Command A, which included the 6th Armored Infantry and the 81st Armorized Reconnaissance Battalion. Combat Command B moved into position at the south end of the "Mouse-trap" and prepared to counter any enemy thrust up the valley.

Carrying on its mission of opening the Tine Valley and covering the British advance on the right, the 6th Armored attacked Hills 299 and 315, key positions in the new German barrier, and less than a mile apart. On 27 April, the 3d Battalion was to move north from 312 against 315 while the 1st Battalion drove northeast from 293 against Hill 299. When the 3d Battalion made its effort early in the morning, it was stopped by a German counterattack that carried through to Hill 312, driving Companies H and I off that hill. The 3d Battalion recovered the hill at 1400, after artillery smashed the German counterattack. Meantime, the 1st Battalion had been unable to advance. The 2d Battalion, released from Combat Command B, moved up during the night of 27 April to relieve the 3d Battalion on Hill 312.

On 28 April the 1st Battalion prepared to renew its assault against Hill 299 while the 2d Battalion advanced against Hill 315. The Germans again counterattacked the 2d Battalion on Hill 312, and again artillery drove them back. At 1600 both battalions moved forward. The 2d Battalion captured Hill 315 at 1800 and began to organize for defense. The 1st Battalion reached Hill 299 and slowly worked forward against strong opposition. The fight continued through the night, the 2d Battalion aiding with fire from 315. Most of Hill 299 was occupied by 0555 on 29 April, but booby traps, mines, and 4 active German machine guns slowed progress. During the night, German troops worked in between Hills 299 and 315 to fire on both positions. The 1st Battalion had suffered heavy casualties
and was holding Hill 299 with only 80 men. Because of this reduced strength, the 3d Battalion was ordered to take over the defense of the hill and relieve the 1st Battalion at 2200 on 30 April. A few enemy infantry clung to the north slope of Hill 299 until about 1800 on 1 May, but the main position was ours. The 6th Armored was ordered to hold on in a defensive line on 2 May.

In some of the heaviest fighting of the campaign, the 1st Armored Division had accomplished its mission and had done its part to spring the "Mousetrap." While the 6th Armored Infantry forced the hills south of the Oued Tine, the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion had been clearing the minefields in the valley, and the tanks of the 1st Armored Division were preparing for a drive north to Mateur.

The 9th Division in the Northern Zone

Plan of Attack

In the northern part of the II Corps zone, the 9th Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. M. S. Eddy) and the Corps Franc d' Afrique (Col., now Brig. Gen., P. J. Magnan) were conducting an offensive which, however "secondary" in the scheme of operations, was achieving very useful results. This action took place so far from the Sidi Nsir-Tine Valley area as to constitute in effect a separate battle, but one which had its place in the Corps' plans and the Corps' success.

On 23 April, the 9th Infantry Division and the Corps Franc d' Afrique held a 28-mile front extending from the sea to a point 5 miles west of Sidi Nsir. (Map No. 2, facing page 9.) The II Corps plan provided that the 9th Division would seize the Ain-chouna-Jefna area, where the Germans held hill fortresses dominating the approach to Mateur through the Sedjenane Valley. In executing this mission, the 9th Division had to meet difficulties imposed both by terrain and by the very broad front involved.

The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron and the 34th Reconnaissance Troop were assigned to patrol vigorously in the 9-mile gap between the 9th and 34th Divisions. No attempt was made to send large units through this area, which gave no access to better routes. Furthermore, it was cut up by small streams, had few trails, and led into rough terrain dominated by flanking ridges. The 47th Regi-
Objectives of the 9th Division from the West

Photographed from terrain model prepared by Camouflage Branch, Engineer Board, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
mental Combat Team was assigned to make a holding attack against the Jefna position. The 39th Regimental Combat Team was to strike at the Djebel Ainchnouna strongpoints north of Jefna. The 60th Regimental Combat Team and the Corps Franc d’Afrique were to drive eastward against the more lightly held positions on both sides of the Sedjenane River. The main German positions around Jefna were to be outflanked through the hills to the north.

JEFNA IS OUTFLANKED

(Map No. 7, inside back cover)

The Jefna position, one of the strongest German defenses in all northern Tunisia, included two heavily fortified hills lying a mile and a half west of Jefna Station and commanding the Mateur road: Djebel el Azzag (Green Hill) on the north of the road and Djebel el Ajred (Bald Hill) on the south.

The 47th Regimental Combat Team, relieving the British 138th Brigade on 13 April, took up positions 5 miles from Jefna Station on both sides of the road and prepared to exert pressure toward Jefna. Bald and Green Hills were subjected to air bombardment and heavy artillery fire. On 23 April, from positions near Hill 398 (Djebel ez Zeboud), the 3d Battalion moved toward Jefna against relatively light opposition and occupied two hills about a mile to the east. These positions were held with only slight changes until 3 May, while strong patrols operated as far east as Green Hill. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion on the south of the road jumped off from Hill 610 (Djebel el Mehachem) and advanced in 4 days through a series of hills to within a mile of Bald Hill. Hill 605 (Kef Maksour) was occupied on the first day (23 April). After strong artillery preparation on 25 April, Hills 598 and 502 were captured. Further advances were made on 26 April, and Hill 501 was occupied during the day, after artillery fire had cleared the hill of enemy troops.

From 29 April to 2 May, while the 39th Regimental Combat Team was outflanking Jefna on the north, the 47th Infantry maintained pressure on the main German positions at Bald and Green Hills. Patrolling was very active, and artillery fire constantly harassed the enemy. Nevertheless, the Germans held tenaciously to their well-prepared fox holes and emplacements on the forward slopes of
Terrain of the Attack on the Ainchouna-Jefna Positions from the West
Photographed from terrain model prepared by Camouflage Branch, Engineer Board, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
Green and Bald Hills. Prisoners captured on 2 May stated that they had been ordered to withdraw toward Bizerte. Patrols confirmed this enemy movement; on 3 May the 47th occupied Bald and Green Hills, and reconnaissance of the Jefna-Mateur road showed it to be free of enemy troops. The withdrawal of the enemy from the very strong Jefna position can be explained only in terms of the successful flanking maneuver in progress to the north.

The 39th Regimental Combat Team had moved onto the spur of high ground south of the Oued Sedjenane on 14-15 April to relieve the British 1st Parachute Brigade. The three battalions then occupied a triangular area made by Djebel Guerba, Djebel Rachouil, and Djebel el Oumela. Four miles east of the center of this area lay Djebel Ainchouna, a series of peaks and ridges about 4 miles long. Minefields guarded the approaches to this high ground, and the enemy positions afforded excellent observation and good fields of fire. Enemy artillery, wherever weak, could be supplemented by tanks employed as mobile artillery. To make an attack, our troops were compelled to struggle through scrub and high underbrush and up rough, steep slopes.

Between 20 April and the morning of the attack, the 39th Combat Team moved forward to the base of Hill 432, without encountering opposition. The attack against Hill 438, the dominating height on Djebel Ainchouna, jumped off at about 0600 on the 23d, with the 1st and 3d Battalions on the line and the 2d Battalion in reserve. The enemy fought stubbornly with rifle, mortar, and machine-gun fire and grenades. As the fight continued on 24 April, the 1st Battalion suffered numerous casualties, including the battalion commander, the executive officer, the intelligence officer, and the Heavy Weapons Company commander. On 25 April, Hill 438 was finally captured by the 1st and 3d Battalions.

During the remainder of the first phase of the campaign, the 39th Combat Team zigzagged from hill to hill, driving the enemy back toward the Mateur plain. On 26 April the 2d Battalion captured Hill 498, a mile southeast of Ainchouna, and Hill 513, a half mile northeast of 498. While the 3d Battalion took over Hill 498, the 2d Battalion pushed on to the east, and on 27 April occupied the south slopes of Hill 382.

The 2d Battalion met strong opposition at Hill 382, which resisted
for 4 days, but the other two battalions were able to move rapidly. At daybreak on 28 April the 1st Battalion drove the enemy from Hill 164, 2 miles north of Ainchouna, and then turned southeast to take Hills 336 and 377, located about 2 miles north of 382.

On 30 April the combat team concentrated its attacks to wipe out the enemy positions in the 382 area. The 1st Battalion attacked Hill 406, less than a mile northwest of Hill 299, captured it before 1000, and then aided the 3d Battalion in a successful drive over Hill 299. At daybreak the 2d Battalion, supported by the Cannon Company and Divisional Artillery, launched an attack against Hill 382 that swept the entire strongpoint.

The 39th Combat Team was now able to exert the strongest pressure on the Jefna position. After the capture of Hills 299 and 382, our infantry held the high ground and had the advantage of dominant observation. German supply routes, dumps, and installations supporting the Jefna defenses were brought under heavy artillery fire. In one day the 26th Field Artillery Battalion fired more than 4,000 rounds with devastating effect. On 1 May the Germans began their withdrawal to the northeast, and when patrols pushed forward the next day they found quantities of abandoned enemy equipment. The 39th Combat Team was then only 3 miles west of the eastern edge of the hill mass and had completely outflanked the Green Hill–Bald Hill positions.

**ACTION NORTH OF THE SEDJENANE (24–27 APRIL)**

The 9th Division put its main effort into the successful flanking attack on Jefna. Farther to the north, the 60th Combat Team and the Corps Franc carried out an operation which extended the flanking movement all the way to the coast and insured that no part of the Axis line would escape pressure (Map No. 8, inside back cover).

This operation took place in the scrub-covered mountains north of the Sedjenane Valley. A road to Bizerte winds through the region, but communications were even more difficult than in the zone farther to the south.

A member of the 60th Combat Team has described the terrain as a continuous challenge to the ingenuity, perseverance, and fortitude of our troops. Supplies, weapons, and ammunition had to be carried by burros, which were often hard to obtain. Numerous patches
of dense scrub, almost impenetrable, hindered advancing troops and required the use of a trail-breaker. The few roads in the area were mined, but the barely distinguishable trails were practically free of mines and booby traps. Because of liaison difficulties and the speed of the advance, attacking units frequently lost contact with their artillery support.

German positions were sometimes defended by a single barbed wire strung so as to break a rush. Frontal attacks were highly impractical because the enemy had the advantage in well-placed machine guns and mortars. Consequently, as in other areas captured by the II Corps, our tactics in this zone were built around flanking maneuvers by small units. Because of the excellent opportunity offered for concealment, retreating enemy troops frequently fell back into the scrub, waiting for nightfall and a chance to infiltrate by patrols.

Starting from Djebels Mergueb and Msid on the 23d, the 60th Combat Team had occupied Hills 165 and 253 (Djebel Oum el Adame) and Hill 294 (Djebel Dardyss) about 4 miles north of Ainchouna, on 24–25 April. Djebel Dardyss was shelled heavily by the Germans at about 1000 on 25 April, but our troops held on.

While the Corps Franc pushed toward Bizerte on the northern flank, the 60th Combat Team assaulted hill positions on both sides of the Sedjenane Valley. On the north, the 2d Battalion moved northeast from Djebel Dardyss–Djebel Oum el Adame toward Hill 299 (Kraim Lerhmed), which was occupied on 28 April. The next day the battalion advanced northeast about 2 miles to Djebel Hazemat (Hill 273) and remained there for 3 days patrolling positions to the front. South of the valley, the 1st Battalion moved northeast from Hill 208 toward Kef Sahan (Hills 337 and 299). One platoon occupied Hill 337 on 28 April, and the rest of the battalion came up the next day. On 30 April, the 1st Battalion continued southeast to occupy Djebel Guermach (Hill 490).

By 29 April the 3d Battalion had advanced northeast about 2 miles to Kef el Zrabin (Hill 230). In this area the enemy held out strongly at Kef en Nsour (Points 412 and 523), lying 2 miles northeast of Djebel Guermach. Two positions in front of Kef en Nsour were taken on 30 April and 1 May. With the assistance of one company of the 1st Battalion, the 3d Battalion captured Kef en
Nsour the next day. Our units had driven to the edge of the hill belt overlooking the Mateur plain and Garaet Achkel, and here again the Germans were fighting on the eastern rim of the best defensive ground.

By 2 May, in the northern sector, the enemy faced the fact that his strongest positions were lost or outflanked. The 9th Division had helped to make inevitable the German retreat to the east.

The German Retreat and the Capture of Mateur

At every point where the II Corps attacked, the enemy had offered bitter and stubborn resistance, marked by frequent counterattacks to recover lost ground. Despite all their efforts, by 1 May the Germans were in a critical situation in the whole II Corps zone. (For the line showing the German position at this date, turn to Map No. 2, facing page 9).

The II Corps advance had dislodged the enemy from his best defensive positions in two areas. In the south, our main effort had fully opened the corridor to Mateur down the Tine Valley. By his failure to retake Djebel el Anz and Hill 609, the enemy was left fighting on the edge of the high ground, with lower rolling country behind him to Mateur. In this country there was no such series of naturally strong positions as the II Corps had just conquered. Full use of our armor was now possible, and a successful American attack north from Djebel Badjar might easily become a breakthrough, cutting off German units still in the hills to the northwest.

The maneuvers of the 9th Division had rendered the enemy's Jefna strongpoints untenable. The flanking columns of the 9th Division had pushed so far northeast of Jefna that the Germans here also were hanging on to the edges of the last high ground protecting the Mateur plain.

To avoid disaster, the enemy facing the II Corps undertook a general retreat on the night of 1–2 May and the next day. His forces in the southern sector withdrew eastward, to positions located from Ferryville south toward Chouigui and Eddekhila. Here, on a north–south belt of hills, the Axis forces might still hope to protect Te-
American Infantry on the Road to Mateur
bourba and the Tunis plain. North of Garaet Achkel the Axis pulled back to the hills bordering that lake and prepared a last-ditch stand on the main road to Bizerte.

The enemy retreat was followed up at once by a powerful striking force. General Harmon, commanding the 1st Armored Division, ordered Combat Command B to move north from the Tine Valley to Mateur. At about 1100 on 3 May the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion entered Mateur, quickly followed by other units. This prompt and aggressive action undoubtedly interfered with the enemy's plan for withdrawal and hampered his organization of defensive positions between Mateur and Ferryville. That this move upset the enemy was shown by his desperate efforts to hold the 1st Armored Division at Mateur. Infantry, armor, artillery, and planes were rushed into the breach from other parts of the front. ME-109's bombed Mateur heavily from 3 to 5 May, trying to knock out rebuilt bridges. Dive bombers and artillery attacked our troops fiercely in an attempt to halt the advance.

The capture of Mateur meant that the main system of German defense in the north was broken. The pressure thus put on the enemy prevented him from effective concentration to meet the British drive in the Medjerda Valley. The II Corps had taken the first major prize of the Allied attack.
THE STORY OF THE SECOND PHASE
(4 May–13 May)

The last phase of the II Corps battle opened on 4 May. Without giving the Germans time to rest or to organize their new positions, the II Corps dealt savage blows at three points in the enemy line. One blow fell north of Garaet Achkel, where the 9th Division and the Corps Franc cleared the hills around Djebel Cheniti in 2 days and then struck through at Bizerte. By 7 May one armored spearhead had reached Ferryville and was fanning out to the east; another armored force lunging east from Mateur was halfway to the Medjerda Valley. While the 1st Division held the enemy on Kef en Nosoura, the 34th broke through the hills near Eddekhila and reached Chougui on 7 May.

Bizerte was in our hands by 8 May, and the German lines in the north were broken beyond hope of recovery. Meanwhile, the British First Army had delivered the knockout blow of the Tunisian campaign. A crushing tank attack which had reduced the German center at Massicault reached Tunis by evening of 7 May. Axis resistance faded rapidly. Nearly all the enemy forces north of Tunis surrendered on 9 May. The bag of the II Corps in the entire operation was some 42,000. In 4 more days the last Axis troops were rounded up, and the campaign for North Africa was over.

The story of the second phase is illustrated on the map attached to this page and on Maps 10 and 11 inside the back cover.
THE SECOND PHASE

Axis Resistance Is Broken

Plans for the Wind up of the Campaign

GENERAL SITUATION ON 2 MAY

The hard-won success of the II Corps and the forced retreat of the Germans in its zone came at a welcome moment from the standpoint of the whole Allied operation.

On the right of the Eighteenth Army Group, the British Eighth Army had advanced to Takrouna but was held up by heavily mined defensive positions. In the center, where the most powerful attacking forces had been grouped, the First Army had gained some ground toward Teboulba and Massicault, but no breakthrough had yet been made. On 1 May, First Army orders directed a regrouping of forces for a fresh effort, with reinforcement of the center by an armored division and other units from the Eighth Army. Our victory in the north came at just the right time to give strongest support to the renewed effort in the center. The German retreat east of Mateur strained the whole enemy line of defense. With the II Corps at Mateur, the right flank of the Germans was endangered. From that area our forces not only threatened Bizerte to the north but could move directly against the rear of the German forces defending Tebourba. Our advance put additional stress on the already weakening Axis lines and played an important part in the enemy collapse a few days later.

PLANS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ARMY GROUP

(Map No. 9, facing page 37)

In order to complete the destruction of Axis forces in Tunisia, the Eighteenth Army Group on 3 May instructed the First Army to attack and capture Tunis. On right and left, the Eighth Army and
the II Corps were to exert maximum pressure to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his units facing the First Army. After taking Tunis, the First Army would exploit to the southeast and east in order to cut off the Cap Bon Peninsula while the Eighth Army pressed forward to the Hammamet area from the south.

On 4 May, the First Army instructed the V Corps to attack on a narrow front. The IX Corps was to pass through the V Corps and capture the inner defenses of Tunis. The II Corps would seize the high ground east and west of Chouigui and take Bizerte.

Plans of the II Corps

In the northern zone of its front the II Corps planned to isolate Axis troops in the area of Garaet Achkel–Lac de Bizerte. The task was assigned to the 9th Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division. To drive the enemy on the west and north sides of Garaet Achkel back toward Bizerte, two regimental combat teams of the 9th Division and the Corps Franc d’Afrique were to operate north-west of the lake. The 1st Armored Division was to push northeast from Mateur to Ferryville, and then cast on the south side of Lac de Bizerte in order to cut the Axis line of retreat from Bizerte to Tunis.

South of the Mateur–Tebourba road, the enemy had fallen back east of the Oued Tine to a defensive line in steep hills following the curve of the river. While the 1st Division advanced northeast from Djebel Badjar against the northern end of this line, the 34th Division was to drive to the east against Eddekhila and Chouigui.

Through to Chouigui

(May No. 10, inside back cover)

The new German line in the southern zone east of the Tine ran from Kef en Nosoura on the north to a cluster of strongpoints be-

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2 At noon on 30 April the 3d Division (Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.) had been alerted to move to the II Corps zone. Within 7 days after the receipt of its order, the entire division had travelled over 700 miles to its destination. On 8 May the 15th Regimental Combat Team was prepared to assist the 1st Division in attack southeast of Mateur. The rest of the division was ready to move into the Ferryville area and to go on to mop up any remaining resistance in the peninsula east of the Tunis–Bizerte road. By 9 May, however, the efforts of the II Corps were so successful that the 3d Division was not needed. The division was then assigned the mission of guarding 38,000 prisoners of war in a cage west of Mateur and of collecting and guarding captured matériel.
tween Eddekhila and Chouigui, 10 miles to the south. Rising steeply 600 to 1,000 feet above the plain, the hills gave the enemy very strong defensive positions protecting Tebourba. These might be turned, however, from the north along the Mateur-Djedeida road, and, if the attack of the British V Corps succeeded, the enemy on these hills would be cut off from retreat toward Tunis.

**HOLDING ATTACK OF THE 1ST DIVISION**

In preparation for an assault on the northern end of the German line, the 1st Division on 5 May occupied the high ground west of the Tine facing the hill mass of Djebel Douimiss, held by the Barenthin Regiment. The next day the 18th and 26th Regimental Combat Teams attacked across the Tine into these hills, supported by H Company of the 1st Armored Regiment. The armored unit was held up by minefields and the collapse of a bridge over a deep wadi. By nightfall the 18th Infantry had suffered numerous casualties and was forced to withdraw west of the Tine during the night. This move left the 26th Infantry holding a salient on the right, and its withdrawal was necessary. The division was then ordered to maintain pressure against the enemy and to prevent any westward movement. Our troops held their lines west of the Tine on 7 May, and on the following day the Barenthin Regiment withdrew.

**THE 34TH DIVISION CAPTURES EDDEKHILA AND CHOUIGUI**

South of the 1st Division, the 34th started from the Djebel Badjar area on 3 May in a drive eastward to Chouigui, the objective. The 168th Infantry led; the 175th Field Artillery Battalion was in support. Patrols of the 168th moved east across the Oued Tine plain without encountering enemy units. The main road leading to Chouigui from the west was patrolled vigorously on 4 May past St. Joseph Farm and up to Eddekhila, again without meeting opposition.

The enemy held the hills south and east of the plain, however, and an attack over the open ground north of Eddekhila would be costly. So, once more, the 34th Division took the hill route. On 5 May, the 168th moved into the rugged country southwest of Eddekhila. The advance over broken ground and steep slopes was slow and difficult, but at the end of the day the 168th Infantry forced the enemy out of Eddekhila.
On 6 May, while the 133d pushed a protective flank south and east of Eddekhila, the 168th turned northward along the hills toward the Chouigui pass. The Germans offered bitter resistance and held up the advance in front of Hill 285. An early morning attack on 7 May carried 285 and the neighboring heights to within a mile of the pass. The Germans then withdrew from Chouigui, and units of the 34th Division occupied the town late in the afternoon. At Chouigui, the 34th Division had reached an ultimate objective assigned to the II Corps in the operational orders of 19 April.

At the same time that the 34th was carrying through to Chouigui, the massive attack of the British V Corps, given tremendous air and artillery support, achieved a decisive breakthrough in the center. Massicault was reached on 6 May, and on 7 May British armor drove through to the city of Tunis. From that time, enemy units were surrendering rapidly in the whole northern Tunisian area, making further movements part of a mopping-up process. While the 168th Infantry operated to end resistance in the Chouigui sector, the 135th Infantry moved on 9 May to clean out positions to the north. The 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion, with Company K of the 135th Infantry and the 34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop attached, operated east out of Chouigui.

North of the Lakes to Bizerte

(Map No. 11, inside back cover, and Sketch No. 1, page 42)

After the German retreat in the northern sector, the new enemy defense extended from Djebel Cheniti (north of Garaet Achkel) southeast through Ferryville, and then south on the high ground northeast of Mateur. Djebel Achkel, south of the lake, remained a useful but isolated stronghold. The new line barred the roads to Ferryville and Bizerte around the shore of Garaet Achkel, but its stability depended upon control of two groups of commanding hills: those around Djebel Cheniti and those southeast of Garaet Achkel protecting the Ferryville isthmus. If the Axis lost Djebel Cheniti, its troops north of Garaet Achkel would have to fall back on Bizerte or risk being trapped at Ferryville by the 1st Armored Division, driving north from Mateur. Should the 1st Armored succeed in penetrating the strongpoints south of Ferryville, the German forces
to the north would be cut off and those to the south would be outflanked.

The 9th Division and the Corps Franc attacked the German positions north of Garaet Achkel, where Djebel Cheniti was the center of the German strength. The tactics against Cheniti were similar to those used earlier to reduce Jefna. The Corps Franc and the 60th Combat Team delivered a holding attack against the strongpoints (Hills 207 and 168); the 47th Combat Team outflanked Cheniti on the north.

![Infantry Battalion Approaching Bizerte](image)

On 4 May the Corps Franc occupied three hills west of Djebel Cheniti. A weak enemy counterattack down the western slopes of Cheniti was broken up by our artillery. On 5 May the 47th Infantry moved up from Jefna and began its flanking movement to drive the enemy from hills on the left of the Corps Franc. The 2d Battalion advanced up Djebel Zouitina and turned east to Hill 208, which it took in the afternoon. Continuing the attack, the 2d Battalion had captured Hill 223, and the 3d was on 165 to the north-northeast by the end of the next day. The 47th Combat Team was now due north of Cheniti and in a position to threaten the Bizerte road.

On 6 May, while the 47th was attacking to the north, the 60th
Infantry passed through the Corps Franc and assaulted Hills 168 and 207, key positions on Djebel Cheniti. The 1st Battalion jumped off at 1300 and 3 hours later had driven the enemy from Hill 168. A half mile to the south, on Hill 207, they met stronger resistance. An artillery concentration disorganized the enemy, and our infantry attacked before the Axis troops could recover. By nightfall part of the hill was captured, but the Germans still held out on the southeastern slopes.

On 7 May the 47th and 60th Combat Teams advanced to cut the Bizerte road. The 2d Battalion of the 47th Infantry attacked from Hill 223 and captured Hill 131, 2 miles to the southeast. The 3d Battalion occupied Hill 125, about 2 miles north of 131, and held it against an armored counterattack in the afternoon. The 60th Infantry continued its attack toward the east, cleaned up the south slopes of Djebel Cheniti, and by the end of the morning reached Hill 114, east of the Bizerte road.

These successes against the key hill positions were decisive. By 1400 on 7 May the enemy was in full retreat, and 6 hours later the 47th Infantry began its march to Bizerte. On 8 May all elements of the 47th Combat Team were in position just northwest of the city ready to repel any counterattack by the Germans. The 60th Combat Team had occupied the high ground commanding the Ferryville–Bizerte road. The northern Axis flank had collapsed.

Meanwhile, on 7 May, the 15th Engineer Battalion, following the 3d Battalion of the 60th Infantry, constructed a ford across Oued Douimiss on the Bizerte road. This allowed the 9th Reconnaissance Troop to reconnoiter Route 11 toward Bizerte, and the Reconnaissance Company of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion to reconnoiter Route 57 toward Ferryville. Using this same passage, Company A of the 751st Tank Battalion, supported by two companies of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, moved up the Bizerte road and entered Bizerte at 1555. The only resistance came from snipers armed with rifles and submachine guns, and from a few light machine guns. The tanks deployed on the streets to seek out and destroy all small-arms fire and machine-gun positions. Some fire was received from artillery south of Bizerte. Seven tanks, placed as counterbattery, knocked out two artillery pieces. When darkness set in, the tank company moved in absolute blackout to bivouac in the central section of the Bizerte airport.
The 9th Reconnaissance Troop had also entered the outskirts of Bizerte during the afternoon. Other units of the 9th Division and the Corps Franc came in the next day. Before evacuating Bizerte the Germans left time bombs in the important buildings and scattered booby traps and mines profusely; even cakes of soap were booby-trapped. With an enemy force of undetermined strength held between Goulet du Lac, Lac de Bizerte, and the Mediterranean, the 9th Division prepared to hold Bizerte and mop up minor resistance around the city.

Breakthrough by the 1st Armored Division

(Map No. 11, inside back cover, and Sketch No. 2, page 45)

The 1st Armored Division had not been able to show its full power in the first phase of the operation, although the threat of armored attack down the Tine Valley had undoubtedly been a factor in forcing the German retreat on 2 May. Now, from the Mateur area, the 1st Armored Division was to strike at the center of the new German line, where two roads led into the Tunis plain: one from Mateur through Ferryville to the Tunis-Bizerte highway and the other from Mateur to Djedeida.

The enemy defense of these roads depended on holding two hill masses. The first, and by far the more important, comprised a 5-mile belt of hills between the Ferryville and the Mateur-Djedeida roads. In these heights lay the main enemy positions. The second was the imposing Djebel Achkel, just south of the lake and rising more than 1,600 feet above the plain. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron was to take care of Djebel Achkel and guard the division's left flank. The primary attack was made by two combat teams, team A operating for a breakthrough at Ferryville and team B aiming for control of the road to Djedeida.

Djebel Achkel

The first move was against this isolated height. Not only did it flank the intended line of our main attack, but from its top the enemy could direct artillery fire on the Mateur plain from batteries as far as 8 miles to the east. The 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, moving to the attack on 4 May, met strong opposition, but by mid-
afternoon of 5 May our troops had advanced about one-third of the way up the mountain and by nightfall had captured the western half, taking more than 80 prisoners.

The remaining enemy forces, only a few hundred strong, put up the stubborn resistance that characterized German fighting in this campaign. Enemy installations in stone buildings at the base of the mountain held out until blasted by a tank-destroyer unit on 9 May. Fighting on the hill continued until 11 May, when more than 300 officers and men of the Hermann Goering Division surrendered—but not until they had verified the report that their general had surrendered on the 9th.
On 6 May, the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment began the main attack on the hills grouped around Djebel el Messeftine, just southeast of Garaet Achkel. The 1st Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment protected the left flank of the attack, and artillery support was given by the 91st and 68th Field Artillery Battalions.

Following an artillery concentration, the 6th Armored Infantry moved across the open plain east of the Mateur-Ferryville road and into a hill mass 600 to 700 feet high. Not only was the ground difficult for armored movement, but the heights were defended with strong forces of infantry supported by tanks. On the left, the 2d Battalion reached Hill 273, the highest point on the Messeftine ridge, by 0626. Here the advance was held up. On the right, the 1st Battalion attacked Hill 253 on the southeastern end of the ridge. This objective and Hill 251, a half mile to the north, were taken by 1000. The enemy still held out at 216, less than a half mile east of 253. At noon the 3d Battalion was ordered to move out from its position west of the Mateur-Ferryville road to drive the enemy from Djebel Cheggaga. By 1630, the 3d Battalion had reached its objective and was mopping up.

The Germans, driven back from the ridge of Messeftine, clung stubbornly to a secondary ridge from Hill 265 to 172. In order to drive the enemy from these positions, the 1st Armored Division launched a coordinated attack by infantry and tanks at 1700. Two companies of the 13th Armored Regiment moved up from the right flank and passed through the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, on Hill 273. The tanks attacked east and southeast against intense antitank and artillery fire. Light rain had made the rugged terrain slippery, and a platoon leader's tank was destroyed when it slid over a 50-foot cliff. While the tanks were maneuvering southeast of Hill 273, the enemy counterattacked the hill from the northeast. A confused and bitter fight took place as tanks battled in the wadis and our infantry struggled to hold the key heights. The enemy overran Hills 251 and 253 by 1900 and continued to attack 273. All but one platoon of our tanks were ordered to withdraw a half hour later. By 2100, the German counterattack had won back the entire ridge from 273 to 253; but the 3d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, held
onto 216 with the aid of artillery fire. Although the German counterattack against Messeftine was successful on 6 May, the enemy could not hold the position because of the advance of Combat Command B on the south.

Combat Command B, consisting of the 13th Armored Regiment and attached units, was operating against the lower hills near the Mateur-Djedeida road. Here the enemy had many concealed antitank guns, which had to be rooted out one by one. Late in the afternoon, while one battalion supported the attack on Messeftine, the rest of Combat Command B was able to clear Djebel el Assafir and advance toward the road junction 6 miles east of Mateur.

On 7 May, the 1st Armored Division launched a three-pronged attack that completely routed the Germans along the Mateur-Ferryville front. At the north end of the German line the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron (with the exception of one troop left on Djebel Achkel) attacked and captured Djebel ez Zarour. The squadron, followed by the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, entered Ferryville shortly after noon. In the center, heavy artillery fire chased the enemy from the Messeftine ridge and the 6th Armored Infantry occupied the hills. The 3d Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment, advanced from the south and found the enemy in full retreat to the east.

Fresh units were brought up from reserve forces to exploit the opening south of Ferryville. The 3d Battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment, which had followed the infantry into Ferryville, now moved out to the east with the mission of cutting the Tunis-Bizerte road, 11 miles away.

South of the Lac de Bizerte, the first objectives of the 3d Battalion and its attached units were the bridge over the Oued ben Hassine and the high ground southeast and south of the bridge, about 4 miles from Ferryville. The battalion deployed on the south side of the road and advanced to the bridge, which was defended by tanks and artillery. While Company G moved south to take the enemy on the flank, the rest of the battalion fired on the high ground east of the stream. Company G gained complete surprise in its flanking movement and drove the enemy onto the flats south of Lac de Bizerte. Darkness prevented complete exploitation of the success, but the bridge was taken intact. The 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, arrived at nightfall to assist in defending the position.
Only two enemy strongpoints of consequence still held out in front of the 3d Battalion. One of these was Hill 151, overlooking the road 4 miles east of the captured bridge; the other was Djebel Sidi Mansour, a mile south of Hill 151. When units of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron advanced east of the bridge on 8 May, enemy fire from Hill 151 and Sidi Mansour threatened to hold up the advance. Company G of the 3d Battalion was ordered to attack Hill 151, with Company I in support. Two platoons of Company G maintained strong frontal fire while the third platoon maneuvered to the south flank and destroyed the enemy.

Meanwhile, Company I, the assault guns, and the 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalion were neutralizing enemy positions on the west side of Sidi Mansour. At 1430, Company I began its move to the western crest of the hill, with the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, following to mop up. After the heavy and sustained “snipe shoot” that preceded the assault, our forces met no real resistance and took 200 prisoners. Beyond the hill to the east, enemy vehicles and personnel were streaming in retreat.

On the last day of the operation, 9 May, the 3d Battalion met practically no opposition. At daylight, Company G moved astride the Tunis–Bizerte road, while Company H advanced toward the village of El Alia. No difficulty was encountered “except that caused by the determination of several thousands of Germans to surrender,” according to an official report. When news of the surrender was announced, the 2d Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry, was in reserve ready to seize the high ground north and east of El Alia. The unit then moved to guard the beaches west of Metline to prevent attempts at escape by sea.

**The Drive to Protville**

While Combat Command A cleared the hills north of the Mateur–Djedeida road on 7 May, Combat Command B moved east on the division’s right flank. The 2d Battalion of the 13th Armored Regiment, with attached units, seized the crossroads 6 miles east of Mateur in the morning and then advanced more than 5 miles to the east. On 8 May, this force attacked to the northeast on the north side of the Djebel el Besbessa ridge, while the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion pushed forward to reconnoiter the Tunis–Bizerte road. Advancing
through rugged terrain, the 2d Battalion cut the road early in the afternoon at the east end of Djebel Menzel Roul.

On 8 May, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Armored Regiment moved east from Mateur on the Djedeida road to protect the right flank of Combat Command B. The first serious opposition was encountered 12 miles east of Mateur at Hill 111, where Companies C and B carried the hill but were driven off by artillery and mortar fire. The attack was stopped there by nightfall. German defense, however, was nearing its end. Next morning, 9 May, Hill 111 was occupied without resistance. Units of the 1st Battalion pushed on to Protville, where they met British units west of the town. As the battalion went beyond Protville and turned north on the Bizerte road, it passed thousands of Axis prisoners and quantities of their discarded arms and equipment. In the last 2 days of enemy disintegration, the battalion had covered 40 miles. The 3d Battalion of the 13th Armored turned north on the Bizerte road on 9 May and then advanced northeast to occupy Porto Farina.

The Axis Surrenders

By 7 May it was apparent that the battle for Tunisia was won. For 2 weeks the enemy had contested every hill furiously and had counterattacked incessantly to recover lost positions. Pushed back and dented, his lines had not been broken. But the unrelenting Allied pressure finally told. By the night of 7 May, the British First Army had driven an armored wedge clear through to Tunis, and the Axis armies were cut in half. At the same moment, U. S. armored units were in Bizerte, and organized resistance by the enemy could not last much longer. In the next 2 days, enemy forces were widely separated and cut off from bases and supplies.

The German units in the II Corps zone were in a particularly hopeless position. The three-pronged eastward drive of the 9th Division and the 1st Armored left only minor enemy groups to be rounded up in the hills. When Combat Command B of the 1st Armored Division met British units at Protville, a main group of German forces, pressed on the west by the 1st and the 34th Divisions, was stranded in the Tebourba area. On 9 May, the Germans in the II Corps area asked for terms. Unconditional surrender was ac-
cepted by Maj. Gen. Fritz Krause at noon; and, as General Bradley’s report states, “All organized resistance in Northern Tunisia in front of the II Corps came to an end.”

Early in the afternoon, six German generals, now prisoners, arrived at II Corps Headquarters. Among them were the commanding generals of the 5th Panzer Army, the 15th Panzer Division, and the Manteuffel Division, the artillery commander of the Afrika Korps, and the commanding general of the Luftwaffe at Bizerte.

Axis resistance in the hill mass southeast of Tunis lasted only a few days longer. On 9 and 10 May, British armor cut off the escape route to the Cap Bon Peninsula. Under pressure by the French on the west and the Eighth Army from the south, the remaining Axis forces surrendered by 13 May.
CONCLUSION

Taking Count

THE MISSION OF THE II CORPS had been threefold: to protect the left flank of the British V Corps; to keep the enemy from concentrating in front of the First Army; and to capture certain major objectives. The II Corps had completed its mission. It had maintained contact all during the operation with the left flank of the British V Corps, which was never menaced. At the beginning of the campaign only about 12,000 front-line enemy troops opposed our advance; at the close of the operation approximately 40,000 enemy troops were in front of the II Corps. All the objectives of the II Corps had been captured, both those assigned initially in the Jefna and Chouigui areas and the ultimate goal, Bizerte. American advances had been coordinated with French and British successes.

The accomplishment of the mission assigned to the II Corps is a record of fighting men with the will and ability to win. It is also the record of an army well supplied, well equipped, and expertly led.

For operations of such scope and intensity, our losses during the campaign for Bizerte were small. Outflanking maneuvers around strong positions such as Bald Hill and Green Hill in the Jefna sector, concentration on key terrain features such as Hill 609, intense artillery bombardment preceding major attacks, and use of armor to exploit infantry successes were important factors in holding casualties to a minimum. The following tabulation shows losses of the II Corps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
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<tr>
<td>1st Division</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Division</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>548</td>
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</tr>
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<td>34th Division</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>470</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>424</td>
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<td>Other Units</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>421</td>
<td>3,136</td>
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</table>
Losses in matériels were likewise very low. Nine light tanks, 40 medium tanks, and 19 halftracks were lost. One 155-mm gun, which had received a direct hit by a 500-pound bomb, was destroyed. Thirteen mortars, 69 automatic weapons, and about 400 other small arms were lost.

Enemy losses in the campaign are reckoned in terms of the total destruction of an army. This is the all-important loss, but even a brief, incomplete statement of some details is of interest. Prisoners of war taken by the II Corps numbered 35,934 Germans, 5,861 Italians, and 41 others. The enemy killed were estimated at 3,000. In addition to the heavy enemy matériel losses in battle, large quantities of equipment and supplies were seized by our troops before the enemy could destroy them. Seven hundred and fifty motor vehicles, 45 halftracks, 75 motorcycles, 50 trailers, 250 artillery pieces, 75 mortars, 750 machine guns, 50 tanks, and 30,000 small arms were among the major items of booty. Likewise, 1,000 tons of ammunition, 1,600 tons of rations, 1,000 tons of clothing and equipment, 75 tons of medical supplies, and 1,000 tires were captured.

The World Acknowledges the Victory

American and French troops of the II Corps distinguished themselves throughout the campaign. “French units under their efficient commander, Colonel Magnan, fought with courage and determination...in mountainous terrain and suffered many casualties. Even though exhausted at the end, they still had but one purpose in mind—to drive the enemy from their shores. Their determination, their courage, and their devotion to their cause were an inspiration to our troops.” So said General Omar N. Bradley, in his report on the operations of the II Corps, and he gave high praise to the men of his command: “Some of the II Corps, namely, the 1st Infantry Division and elements of the 1st Armored and 34th Infantry Divisions, have been fighting in North Africa almost continuously since they landed at Oran on 8 November. Other units have been in action in Tunisia for varying periods from 18 January onward. Practically all units have fought the enemy both in the desert and in the mountains. The II Corps has fought with and without air superiority. It has suffered reverses, and it has known
victory. Officers and men alike understand our enemy and his methods. They no longer underestimate or overestimate his abilities. With the common sense that is characteristic of Americans, they have learned that the surest way of living is to outmaneuver and outsmart those who oppose us. With their practical sense, their understanding of the enemy, their first-hand knowledge of the hardships and dangers of war, and above all else their courage and loyalty, soldiers of the II Corps have played a major role in the winning of a great Allied victory.”

In a special Order of the Day, dated 13 May, General Sir Harold R. Alexander, Commander of the Eighteenth Army Group, addressed the Allied forces: “Today you stand as the conquerors and heroes of the North African shores. The world acknowledges your victory; history will acclaim your deeds. British, French, and American arms have swept from these lands the last of the German and Italian invaders. As your Commander in the Field, I add my admiration and gratitude to those of the United Nations for this great victory, which will go down to history as one of the decisive battles of all time.”
Annex No. 1

Units Taking Part in the Bizerte Campaign

The following items do not constitute an official Station List.

(ATTACHMENTS AS OF 9 MAY 1943)

II Corps:
Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

1st Division:
16th, 18th, and 26th Infantry Regiments; 7th, 32d, 33d, and 5th Field Artillery Battalions; 1st Engineer Battalion; 1st Quartermaster Company; 1st Medical Battalion; 1st Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop; 1st Signal Company; 701st Ordnance Company.

Attached: 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion; 105th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Detachment, 2624th Signal Service Regiment; Air Support Party.

1st Armored Division:
1st and 13th Armored Regiments; 6th Armored Infantry Regiment; 27th, 68th, and 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalions; 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion; 16th Armored Engineer Battalion; 141st Armored Signal Company; 1st Armored Supply Battalion; 1st Armored Maintenance Battalion; 47th Armored Medical Battalion.

Attached: 91st Reconnaissance Squadron; 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion; 443d Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Air Support Party.

9th Division:
39th, 47th, and 60th Infantry Regiments; 26th, 60th, 84th, and 34th Field Artillery Battalions; 15th Engineer Battalion; 9th Quartermaster Company; 9th Medical Battalion; 9th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop; 9th Signal Company; 709th Ordnance Company.
Attached: 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion; 434th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Battery H, 67th Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment; 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion; Corps Franc d’Afrique; Air Support Party.

34th Division:
133d less 2d Battalion, 135th, and 168th Infantry Regiments; 125th, 151st, 175th, and 185th Field Artillery Battalions; 109th Engineer Battalion; 109th Quartermaster Battalion; 109th Medical Battalion; 34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop; 34th Signal Company; 734th Ordnance Company.
Attached: 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion; 751st Tank Battalion; 107th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Air Support Party.

3d Division (assisted in mopping up):
7th, 15th, and 30th Infantry Regiments; 10th, 39th, 41st, and 9th Field Artillery Battalions; 10th Engineer Battalion; 3d Quartermaster Company; 3d Medical Battalion; 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop; 3d Signal Company; 703d Ordnance Company.

13th Field Artillery Brigade:
1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion; 17th, 36th, and 178th Field Artillery Regiments.
Attached: 106th Coast Artillery (AA) Battalion; Headquarters, 5th Armored Artillery Group; Battery E, 67th Coast Artillery (AA) Regiment; 58th and 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalions; 1st Battalion, 213th Coast Artillery Regiment, less Batteries C and D; 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

2626th Coast Artillery Brigade (AA):
Headquarters, 2626th Coast Artillery Brigade; Batteries C and D, 213th Coast Artillery Regiment; 3d Battalion, 213th Coast Artillery Regiment; 690th, 692d, and 694th Coast Artillery Batteries (Airborne); 436th Coast Artillery Battalion; 67th Coast Artillery Regiment, less Batteries E and H and 1st and 3d Battalions.

Corps Troops:
Armored: 2642d Armored Replacement Battalion.
Signal: 53d Signal Battalion.
Attached: Army Pictorial Service; Detachments, 162d and 163d Signal Companies; 177th Signal Replacement Company; Detachments, 2624th and 2625th Signal Service Regiments; Detachments, African Headquarters, British, French.

Medical: 51st Medical Battalion.

Attached: Detachments, 56th Medical Battalion; 2d and 3d Auxiliary Surgical Groups; 2d Battalion, 16th Medical Regiment. Attached: Detachments, 2d and 3d Auxiliary Surgical Groups; 9th, 11th, 15th, and 128th Evacuation Hospitals.

Engineer: 19th and 20th Engineer Regiments; 2d Platoon, 470th Engineer Company; 518th Engineer Water Supply Company; 62d Engineer Topographical Company; Company B, 601st Engineer Camouflage Battalion.

Quartermaster: 2618th Provisional Quartermaster Truck Battalion; 1st Battalion, 28th Quartermaster Regiment (Truck), less Companies B and C, but plus Company K and Provisional Truck Company; 93d Quartermaster Company; Company A, 205th Quartermaster Battalion; Company C, 263d Quartermaster Battalion.

Ordnance: Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Provisional Ordnance Group; Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Medical Detachment, 42d Ordnance Battalion.

Attached: 53d Ordnance Battalion; 82d, 109th, and 3485th Ordnance Companies; Company A, 67th Ordnance Battalion; Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Medical Detachment, 188th Ordnance Battalion.

Attached: 29th, 991st, and 3488th Ordnance Companies.
Annex No. 2

Decorations

(Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, and Silver Star Only)

The following list of decorations is based on the best records available to date but is not necessarily complete. The list is arranged alphabetically by name, showing rank, arm or service, residence, organization, station, and date of citation. Posthumous awards are indicated by an asterisk (*).

Distinguished Service Cross

2D Lt. Geoffrey C. Ferris*, FA, Connecticut, 1st Division, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
1st Lt. Richard L. Harris, Inf., New York, organization not indicated, 30 April 1943.
Capt. Felix P. Settlemire, Inf., Arkansas, organization not indicated, Sedjenane, 23 April 1943.
Lt. Col. Albert A. Svooboda, Inf., Illinois, 34th Division, Tunisia, 30 April 1943.
Pfc. Anthony P. Coll, MD, Pennsylvania, organization not indicated, Tebourba, 6 May 1943.
S/Sgt. Gerry H. Kisters, Cav., Indiana, 1st Armored Division, Tunisia, 7 May 1943.
S/Sgt. Frank J. Matwizyck*, Inf., New York, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
Pfc. Sidney Rapeport*, Inf., Ohio, 1st Division, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
Distinguished Service Medal


Silver Star

1st Lt. John V. Barnette, FA, North Carolina, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 28 April 1943.
1st Lt. Linwood W. Billings, Inf., New Hampshire, 1st Division, Mateur, 6 May 1943.
Col. Eugene F. Caffey, CE, Georgia, organization not indicated, Tunsia,—May 1943.
Capt. Howard F. Casey, FA, Massachusetts, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 28 April 1943.
Capt. Ted H. Corry, FA, Oklahoma, 34th Division, Sedjenane, 27 April 1943.
2d Lt. William O. Cox, Jr.*, Inf., Ohio, 1st Division, Tunisia, 28 April 1943.
Capt. Elbert N. Du Puy, MC, West Virginia, 1st Armored Division, Mateur, 7 May 1943.
Capt. Howard L. Fielden, FA, Oklahoma, 1st Armored Division, Ferryville, 7 May 1943.
1st Lt. John P. Foley, Inf., New York, 1st Division, Mateur, 6 May 1943.
1st Lt. George K. Folk, Inf., Ohio, 1st Division, 23 April 1943.
Capt. Thomas A. Green*, Inf., Michigan, 1st Armored Division, Mateur, 7 May 1943.
1st Lt. Albert J. Haft, MC, New York, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 May 1943.
1st Lt. Kent Herrin, SC, Tennessee, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 May 1943.
1st Lt. William W. Kriebel, Inf., Indiana, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 29 April 1943.
2d Lt. Richard V. Lohrens, Inf., Illinois, 1st Division, Tunisia, 1 May 1943.
Capt. Paul R. Lowry, FA, Texas, 9th Division, Tunisia, 28 April 1943.
Capt. Lauren E. McBride, Inf., Iowa, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 11 May 1943.
1st Lt. Albert G. Preston, Jr., Inf., New York, 1st Division, Mateur, 6 May 1943.
Capt. Carl O. Randall, Jr., Inf., New Hampshire, 1st Division, Mateur, 23 April 1943.
1st Lt. David J. Rogers, FA, Florida, 1st Armored Division, Ferryville, 8 May 1943.
Capt. Francis J. Rosinski, Inf., New Hampshire, 1st Division, Beja, 23 April 1943.
Capt. Isaac H. Rowand, FA, Illinois, 9th Division, Tunisia, 28 April 1943.
Capt. Raymond W. Sellers, Inf., Washington, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
1st Lt. R. J. Shallenberger, Inf., Massachusetts, 9th Division, Tunisia, — May 1943.
2d Lt. Orion C. Shockley, Inf., Missouri, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 May 1943.
1st Lt. Earl R. Sieber, Inf., Washington, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 6 May 1943.
Capt. Anthony Sordill, MC, New Jersey, 9th Division, 1 May 1943.
2d Lt. Joseph Sturm, Inf., Ohio, organization not indicated, Mateur, 7 May 1943.
1st Lt. William E. Tolbert, Inf., Illinois, 1st Division, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
2d Lt. Robert E. Wear, Cav., Florida, 1st Division, Mateur, 7 May 1943.
Maj. James F. White, CE, Ohio, organization not indicated, Tunisia, — May 1943.
2d Lt. WILLIAM R. WHITE, AC, Texas, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 27 April 1943.
1st Lt. EDWARD F. WOZENSKI, Inf., Connecticut, 1st Division, Mateur, 5 May 1943.
CAPT. JONATHAN YERKES, Jr.*, Inf., Florida, 1st Division, 25 April 1943.
Pfc. JAMES ANDERSON, MD, Pennsylvania, 34th Division, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
Pfc. ALBERT ANDY, Inf., New York, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 24 April 1943.
Pfc. ROBERT ARDELL, Inf., Wisconsin, 9th Division, 24 April 1943.
Sgt. ANTHONY A. AUENTI, Inf., Connecticut, 1st Division, Tunisia, 30 April 1943.
S/Sgt. JOHN F. BAARS, Inf., New Jersey, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 1943.
Pvt. FRANK J. BAFARO, Inf., Illinois, 1st Armored Division, Fondouk, 23 April 1943.
Tec. 5 NEWBORN BATES, MD, Alabama, 1st Division, Tunisia, 23 April 1943.
Pfc. FRED J. BECKS, Inf., Ohio, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
Pvt. ALBERT W. BELTHUIS, Inf., Iowa, organization not indicated, Tunisia, — May 1943.
Sgt. EARL G. BLAIR, Inf., Texas, 1st Armored Division, Fondouk, 23 April 1943.
Pfc. HERBERT W. BRASINGTON, Inf., South Carolina, 9th Division, Tunisia, 24 April 1943.
Pfc. WALTER L. BRYSON, Inf., Texas, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 24 April 1943.
Sgt. MARINELLO S. CAPONE*, Inf., New Jersey, 9th Division, Tunisia, — May 1943.
Sgt. JAMES D. CHANCELLOR, Inf., Oklahoma, 1st Division, 26 April 1943.
Pfc. NICK W. CINDRIC, Jr., Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, Tunisia, 28 April 1943.
Sgt. CHARLES H. CLAY, Inf., New York, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
1st Sgt. FRANK COCHRANE, Inf., California, 1st Division, Tunisia, 28 April 1943.
PVT. WALTER L. COLTER, Inf., Ohio, 1st Division, 28 April 1943.
PVT. CHARLES C. CONNE, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
PFC. PIERSON S. CRAWFORD, Inf., Connecticut, 1st Division, 29 April 1943.
TEC. 5 JOSEPH F. DARDEEN, CE, Ohio, organization not indicated, Tunisia, — May 1943.
PFC. JAMES H. DEAL, MD, Iowa, organization not indicated, Tunisia, — May 1943.
PVT. ERNEST C. DELANEY, MD, South Dakota, 1st Division, Tunisia, 1 May 1943.
PVT. THEODORE J. DOSKUS, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
SGT. LEO B. DUBOIS, Inf., New York, 1st Armored Division, Fondouk, 23 April 1943.
PFC. GEORGE DULONG, Inf., Massachusetts, 1st Division, Mateur, 7 May 1943.
Tec. 5 SAMUEL J. ELLIOTT*, Inf., Indiana, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
Tec. 5 LEONARD B. ELLIS, SC, Nebraska, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 7 May 1943.
PFC. FOSTER EVANS, Inf., West Virginia, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
PFC. CLAYTON S. FORD, Inf., Michigan, 1st Division, Tunisia, 23 April 1943.
PFC. ROBERT L. FRANER, MD, Ohio, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
PVT. WARREN E. GATES, JR., Inf., Massachusetts, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 1943.
CPL. WALTER GAVITT, Inf., Pennsylvania, 9th Division, Tunisia, 24 April 1943.
PFC. JOHN J. GERAGHTY, MD, New York, 1st Division, Tunisia, 5 May 1943.
Tec. 5 HERMAN GILLIS, CE, Georgia, organization not indicated, Tunisia, — May 1943.
PFC. RALPH F. GOODENOUGH, Inf., Connecticut, 1st Division, Mateur, 6 May 1943.
PVT. RALPH W. GRAZIOLA, MD, Vermont, 1st Division, Tunisia, 23 April 1943.
SGT. GEORGE J. GRILLO, MD, New Jersey, 9th Division, 3 May 1943.
Sgt. Robert E. Hentges, Inf., Iowa, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 1 May 1943.
Pfc. Richard J. Jacobsen, MD, Iowa, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
Cpl. Theodore E. Junkins, Inf., Alabama, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 1 May 1943.
Tec. 5 David M. Kendall, Jr., SC, New York, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 May 1943.
Pvt. Ross A. La Monica, SC, Ohio, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 May 1943.
Pfc. Robert E. Lakim, MD, Iowa, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.
Sgt. Raymond E. Larson, FA, Minnesota, 1st Armored Division, Tunisia, 8 May 1943.
Sgt. Daniel S. Lubowitz, Inf., Michigan, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 1 May 1943.
Pvt. Ralph Mendoza, MD, New York, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
Pvt. Ira M. Merklinger, Inf., New York, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
1st Sgt. John W. Miller, Inf., New York, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 24 April 1943.
Tec. 5 John J. Neundorf, Inf., New York, 1st Division, Tunisia, 23 April 1943.
Pfc. Clarence A. Norder, FA, Wisconsin, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 22 April 1943.
Pvt. Joseph V. Okolowicz, Inf., Wisconsin, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
Sgt. Roy G. Paquin, Inf., Michigan, 9th Division, Tunisia, 24 April 1943.
Pvt. John H. Parker, Inf., Mississippi, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 1943.
Pvt. Mike J. Pavella, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, Tunisia, 23 April 1943.

S/Sgt. William E. Payne, Inf., Kentucky, 1st Armored Division, Fondouk, 23 April 1943.

Pfc. Walter B. Peeples, Inf., Maryland, 1st Division, Tunisia, 23 April 1943.


Sgt. Alvin L. Pierce*, FA, Tennessee, 13th Field Artillery Brigade, Tunisia, 9 May 1943.

Pfc. Fred C. Planty, Inf., New York, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 1943.

Pfc. Leroy A. Potter*, Inf., Ohio, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.

Pfc. Richard J. Powers, FA, Massachusetts, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 22 April 1943.

Pvt. Peter W. Prokity, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.

Pvt. Martin Quinn, Inf., New Jersey, 1st Division, Tunisia, 23 April 1943.

Pvt. John J. Quirke, MD, New York, 1st Division, Tunisia, 28 April 1943.

Cpl. Frank A. Rice, Inf., Ohio, 1st Division, Tunisia, 6 May 1943.

Sgt. James R. Robertson*, Inf., Georgia, 34th Division, Tunisia, 1 May 1943.

Pvt. David W. Robicheau, Inf., Massachusetts, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 1943.

Tec. 4 Thomas K. Ruby, SC, New Jersey, 9th Division, Bizerte, 7 May 1943.

Sgt. Stephen Ruzycki, AC, New Jersey, organization not indicated, Tunisia, — May 1943.

S/Sgt. Alfred J. Sanford, Inf., New York, 1st Division, 29 April 1943.


Pfc. Seymour Schneider, MD, New York, 1st Division, Mateur, 5 May 1943.

Sgt. Irvine R. Schoonover, Inf., New York, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 7 May 1943.
Sgt. Clyde K. Scott, Inf., Illinois, organization not indicated, Tunisia, — May 1943.
1st Sgt. Harold W. Sell, Inf., Wisconsin, 9th Division, Sedjenane, 27 April 1943.
Pfc. Francis E. Shaw, Inf., New York, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 1943.
Pfc. Earnest E. Shumate, Inf., Georgia, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 1943.
Pvt. Vinson E. Smith, Inf., Alabama, organization not indicated, Tunisia, 7 May 1943.
Pfc. Richard C. Snow, MD, Massachusetts, 1st Division, Mateur, 5 May 1943.
Cpl. Meyer Spiegel, Inf., Massachusetts, 1st Division, Tunisia, 26 April 1943.
Pfc. Joseph M. Staid, Inf., Mississippi, 1st Division, Mateur, 4 May 1943.
Cpl. Woodrow W. Taylor, Inf., Ohio, 1st Division, Tunisia, 22 April 1943.
Cpl. Nick Vincich, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, Tunisia, 1 May 1943.
Tec. 4 Robert H. Waldsmith, Inf., California, 1st Armored Division, Mateur, 6 May 1943.
Pvt. Claud L. Watkins, MD, Oklahoma, 1st Division, Mateur, 5 May 1943.
S/Sgt. Earl L. Wills, MD, New York, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
Cpl. Charles L. Wilson, Inf., Pennsylvania, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.
Pfc. Walter W. Wisniewski, MD, Pennsylvania, organization not indicated, Tunisia, — May 1943.
Pvt. Carl H. Wooden, Jr., Inf., New York, 1st Division, 29 April 1943.
Pvt. Louis R. Zick*, Inf., New Jersey, 34th Division, Tunisia, 1 May 1943.
Pfc. Frank J. Zysk, Inf., Connecticut, 1st Division, 30 April 1943.

64
Mateur, important communications center, was main objective of first phase of battle for northern Tunisia. (P. 9 and Maps Nos. 2 and 3).
Mateur, captured on 3 May 1943 after II Corps, in ten days, overcame strongly-fortified German hill defenses. (P. 9, Maps Nos. 2 and 3).
Djebel El Hara and Hill 375, the fortified ridge west of Hill 609. (See p. 16 and Map No. 5).
Sidi Nsir region, defended by the Germans against 34th Division attack. (See pp. 16–21 and Maps Nos. 2 and 5).
Hill 609, the main objective in the Sidi Nsir region, was captured 1 May 1943 by the 34th Division. (See p. 21 and Maps Nos. 2 and 5).
Another View of Hill 609. (See
pp. 16-21 and Maps Nos. 2 and 5).
Djebel El Anz and Djebel Badjar, objectives of the 1st Division in its drive to push the enemy from his positions in the Tine Valley. (See p. 21 and Map No. 5).
Hills 388 and 420, two German fortresses that slowed the 6th Armored Infantry's drive through the Tine Valley. (See p. 24 and Map No. 6).
Region South of the Tine where the 81st Reconnaissance Battalion and the 6th Armored Infantry prepared way for 1st Armored Division tanks. (See pp. 25-26 and Map No. 6).
Series of Hills through which the 1st Battalion of the 47th Regimental Combat Team made its advance in the movement to outflank Jefna. (See pp. 28-30 and Map No. 7).
The Jefna Region. Here for three days the Germans held on in their emplacements in the face of continued pressure from the 47th Infantry. (See pp. 28–31 and Map No. 7).
The Tine River Valley, scene of the 34th Division's push to Chouigui, an objective in second phase of operations. (Pp. 39-40, Maps Nos. 9 and 10).
The Tine River Valley (Same section shown in photo, page 73. Pp. 39-40, Maps Nos. 9 and 10).
IST DIVISION DRIVE TO
DJ. SIDI MEFTAH
23-27 APRIL 1943

PREPARED BY HISTORICAL SECT., A.W.C.
TH DIVISION ATTACK ON THE AINCHOUNA-JEFNA POSITIONS
23 APRIL-1 MAY 1943

PREPARED BY HISTORICAL SECTION, ARMY WAR COLLEGE
SUMMARY OF II CORPS OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN TUNISIA
23 APRIL - 9 MAY 1943
PREPARED BY HISTORICAL SIO, A.W.C.